Category Archives: Supplier
An aging analysis is often needed to mount an ordinary course defense in a preference action that a debtor has initiated against your client creditor, who could be a supplier, a lender, a trade creditor, a landlord.
EXAMPLE: Debtor retail toy store buys toy inventory from Defendant Supplier Creditor on Net 30 day terms and has done so for years. Debtor always paid in about 45- 60 days (or 15 to 30 days late– the “lag time”). The purchase history is evidenced by 1000’s of invoices, purchase orders, and checks. As the Debtor started its “slide into bankruptcy”, it slowed down payments to this Supplier Creditor and started paying in 75 to 100 days after invoice within the 90 days prior to filing bankruptcy (35-70 day “lag time”). Debtor paid Supplier $100,000 in those 90 days about 75-100 days after invoice. Post- bankruptcy, the Debtor or a Trustee sues the Supplier Creditor for a return of the $100,000 alleging that the payments were preferential payments.
To argue the ordinary course of business defense provided for creditors in the Bankruptcy Code, the Supplier must show that the timing of the payments in the 90 day period was consistent with Pre-Preference Period transactions, that this was a typical supplier/debtor credit relationship where the Debtor and Supplier over time had fallen into a pattern of regularly paying and accepting payments on a late basis. The Supplier must show that during the Preference Period, the average lag times remained substantially the same. The Creditor had come to expect this and had accepted these payments to be made in the “ordinary course of business.”
As a debtor draws closer to the filing of a bankruptcy, it is generally the case that almost all invoices will be paid with less frequency. A creditor must prove more than just that fact. See Hansen Lumber, 270 B.R. 273 (even where representative of debtor acknowledged that as debtor got closer to filing bankruptcy, the invoices were being paid with less frequency and the creditor defendant was treated no differently than any of the debtor’s other suppliers, debtor’s batch payments to supplier were still preferential). Generally speaking, there have been two ways in which Courts have done an “aging analysis” comparing the timing of preferential payments to the course of dealings established by the payment history between the parties: the “ranging method” and the “averaging method”.
For the “ranging method,” the first step is determining the range of “lag times” for payments made by the Debtor to the Creditor during the Preference Period, (if possible, also taking into consideration both the number of invoices and the dollar amount of invoices). The second step is determining whether this Preference Period range of “lag times” falls within, or close to, the range of lag times for payments made by the debtor to the creditor prior to the Preference Period. Calculating a “lag time” is described below.
For the “averaging method,” a creditor simply compares the average “lag time” for payments made during the Preference Period with payments made during the Pre-Preference Period. To calculate the average, one must first count the days after invoice date for each invoice, add up the total number of days and divide by the total number of invoices. Global Distribution, 103 B.R. 949, 953 n.3 (citing In re First Software Corp., 81 B.R. 211, 213 (Bankr. D. Mass.1988). If a debtor is a making payment to the creditor which pays many invoices (a batch basis), there is an issue as to whether the “lag time” is calculated on a “batch” basis or on an “unbatched” basis (invoice by invoice). Uh. yeah, this analysis can get more complicated.
As I have previously written here, I have developed an extensive series of excel spreadsheets to generate an “aging analysis” to defend preference litigation. I am able to take a client’s 1000s of invoice transactions, input them into excel and do an analysis using both the “ranging” and “averaging” methods on both a “batched” and “unbatched” basis. The analysis must also account for how the “Ordinary Course” defense interplays with the “New Value” defense (another defense to preference allegations). More on that later.
In true scholarly fashion, I amassed 100’s of cases in various Circuits that scrutinize what is a reasonable “average” or reasonable “range” in determining whether a transfer is ordinary or not.
I know this is riveting stuff. But, this type of litigation can make or break a creditor, thrusting the creditor also into a liquidation itself if forced to disgorge payments a Chapter 11 Debtor has made to it for bona fide goods or services. Trust me, my clients are fuming after being hit with one of these lawsuits.
Feel free to reach out if you have any additional questions about the “aging analysis” in a preference action. The age of the transaction is only one factor in determining whether a transfer is or is not within the ordinary course defense, but albeit a weighty one.
This post does not constitute legal advice. Consult an attorney about your specific case.